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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company,
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politic and political
subdivision of the State of
Utah,
Defendant-Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED
Docket No. 20100923SC

PRELIMINARY NOTE: CITATION TO/OF "BAM III" DECISION
The Plaintiff-Appellant herein continues to utilize the
designation of 2008 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
this case as "BAM III". That designation

given the fact

that there were two previously-reported appellate court
decisions

more

accurately

reflects

conventional

nomenclature in such situations. [The COUNTY'S designation
of the 2008 appellate decision as "BAM II" is, for those
reasons, confusing and will not be followed.]
PLAINTIFFS REPLY ARGUMENT
In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309,
129 LEd2d 304

(1994), the United States Supreme Court,

quoting from an earlier decision, wrote:
One of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people to bear public burdens which/ in all

fairness, should be borne by the public as a
whole."
114 SCt at 2316. Emphasis added. In this case, the Plaintiff
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT has been forced

through application of

the COUNTY'S "highway-abutting Ordinance"

to singularly

bear public burdens (e.g. dedication and improvement costs
of $391,000+ for State Road 171) which should be borne by
the public as a whole. The discriminatory effect of the
"highway-abutting Ordinance" is readily apparent on its
face: developers of parcels adjacent to major roadways are
required to sustain the full expense of dedication and
improvement, while similarly-situated (but not "abutting")
parcels creating the same impact are immune therefrom.
The COUNTY has filed its BRIEF OF APPELLEE, therein
reciting and presenting its "costs to the governments" (or
the

"costs

to

the

community")

argument

successfully

presented to the trial court. Thus, seemingly, this "appeal"
might actually appear to be an argument about what the BAM
III decision really means, moreso than whether or not the
District

Court

properly

followed

the

Supreme

Court's

directives.
To the extent that the adduced evidence (i.e. "that the
County has no costs", herein admitted within this appeal)
conforms to the Supreme Court's original intentions, the
case

can be

decided

on

the

basis

of

that

evidence,

notwithstanding Judge Toomey's failure to follow the Supreme
2
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"what the cost of dealing with * he impact would be to the
County". [That cost (to the County) is zero.] The District
Court allowed the COUNTY to present vague, rambling and
conjectural evidence

through testimony of persons having

absolutely no connection to the material issues of this case
except as their "hired gun" status as "expert witnesses"
as what the "costs to the community" speculatively might be,
at some abstract time in the future, if and when UDOT ever
decides to improve the State Road 171 roadway.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 1
CLAIMED FAILURE BY APPELLANT TO MARSHAL TRIAL EVIDENCE
The
evidence"

claimed
is

a

"failure

to marshal

spurious

argument:

the
a

trial
red

court

herring

intentionally calculated to divert the Court's attention
from the true arguments at hand
The Plaintiff and its counsel are well aware of the
appellate "rule" and legitimate judicial expectation in
satisfaction thereof. The COUNTY, however, should not be
rewarded for having "cluttered up" the re-trial of the case
through the admission of ail kinds of irrelevant evidence,
and then claim a "marshaling" requirement to wade through
all of that irrelevant evidence. Likewise, the Court should
not

in the face of the District Court's obvious failure to

abide by the Supreme Court "mandate" (to "determine costs to
the County")

expect the non-pievailing party to "marshal

the evidence" in support of the trial court's verdict based
4

upon the clearly-erroneous legal standard (i.e. "costs to
the community").
Within its APPELLANT'S BRIEF the Appellant did "marshal
the evidence": the evidence was and continues to be "the
County has no costs". That fact
costs"

that "the County has no

has been affirmatively admitted by the COUNTY'S own

BRIEF is now confirmed.
In his case, there is simply no evidence that the
County had "costs". To the contrary, the simple fact that
the "County has no costs" has been expressly admitted. For
example, the COUNTY'S brief states:
Hence, while the County has (so far) incurred no
direct cost to improve the road, the County also
has received no direct "benefit" from the
exaction.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, page 21. Emphasis added.
The County's logic and argument (benefit of zero makes
its

"costs"

to

be

zero)

is

confusing.

It

fails

to

appreciate, understand and follow the "rough equivalence"
test of BAM III and of Dolan. The COUNTY'S "benefit" (to the
County) argument is fundamentally flawed, as the analysis
and application thereof misconstrue the actual "inverse
condemnation" claims of the Plaintiff: namely, that B.A.M.
was unconstitutionally required (by the COUNTY) to make the
$391k worth of "excessive" improvements. Whether the COUNTY
received any "benefit" from the installed improvements is
absolutely

irrelevant

to this constitutional
5

"takings"

question. The COUNTY "forced" B.A.M. to make the dedications
and improvements; if the Court's determination that those
improvements and dedication were "excessive", the COUNTY
should be the entity to repay those expenses.
The County asserts (p. 21) that 3.A.M.'s costs are the
same, whether the roadway is owned by the County or the
State. That statement is not necessarily true. In any event,
the description
Plaintiff's

confuses the basic1 premise upon which

claims have been framed: namely, that the

County's "highway-abutting Ordinance " required the fullwidth dedication and improvement ol the State Road 171
right-of-way, when "State" requirements
were none

actually, there

would not have required any exaction. [Not only

did the State not have any development-based "impact fees"
or exactions, but the State gets "fu^ls taxes" and similar
revenues for such expenditures.]
That

the

"County

has

no

co^ts"

is

additionally

confirmed by Footnote 35 to its BRIEF OF APPELLEE (page 21) ,
which footnote states:
. . . Thus, BAM's repeated ins stence that "the
County has no costs" to wide I 3500 South is
misleading. While the County may have incurred no
direct costs to date, if a future "jurisdictional
transfer" devolved ownei ship of the road to the
County, then the County v*ould be directly burdened
by the costs to widen the road wl en such a project
takes place. In other v.ords, the fact that the
County has not yet incurred direct costs to widen
the road doesn't mean it never will.
Emphasis added. Italicized words "to date" and "yet" in
G

original text.
The

COUNTY'S

"jurisdictional

transfer"

(and

Mr

Nepstad's testimony and analysis based thereon) is entirely
speculative and conjectural. The case has been pending for
over thirteen years, and the COUNTY has not incurred a
single penny of expense for the capital improvements to the
State Road 171 roadway.
And

regardless

of

the

substance

thereof,

the

discriminatory effect of the exactions imposed singularly
against B.A.M. is still unchanged.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 2
SCOPE OF PLAINTIFF'S "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CASE
The COUNTY continues

for its self-serving reasons

to mischaracterize the Plaintiff's substantive claims to be
(erroneously)

some

kind

of

"appeal"

of

a

"land-use"

decision. That characterization has never been accurate, and
it is not now accurate; any substantive effect arising from
such mischaracterization is improper. This case, and the
"constitutional 'just compensation'" claims made therein, is
not an "appeal" of a land-use decision. This case is an
"inverse condemnation" claim, for "excessive" governmental
"takings" effected by the COUNTY pursuant to its "highwayabutting Ordinance". The scope and magnitude of those
"takings" cannot be

and have not been

COUNTY.
7

denied by the

The scope of the Plaintiff's claim is determined by the
operational allegations of its filed complaint, not some
preliminary

correspondence

filed with

the governmental

entity which refused to consider Plaintiff's claims. [The
COUNTY Board of Commissioners didn't merely deny the claims.
The Board refused to hear the claims.]
Likewise, the Plaintiff's initial submission of the
proposed

subdivision

"plat"

(showing

the

roadway

improvements at the so-called "40-foot line") was done so in
conformity to County administrative staff instructions and
directions, in accordance with the Ordinance. Plaintiff's
submission of that plat was not a waiver of his "inverse
condemnation" rights (to receive "just compensation") to
challenge the Ordinance.
That in the initial trial Judge Timothy Hanson made an
improper evidentiary ruling is insignificant. Judge Hansen
had

at the COUNTY'S guidance

the entire first trial all

scrambled up, and he (Judge Hansen) was reversed on appeal.
That

the

inaccurate

appellate

court

decision

suggestion

in

at

the

COUNTY'S

preliminary

dicta

mischaracterized the scope of Plaintiff's claims should
likewise be insignificant and inconsequential. The Court of
Appeals, like Judge Hanson, "got things wrong", prompting
both parties to petition for certiorari. That the Utah
Supreme Court in granting certiorari, on the three narrow
8

issues it chose to specify, did not identify this narrow
issue

should be

inconsequential, particularly

for the

COUNTY. The COUNTY had argued that the case should be
remanded back to the county's hearing board (as the Court of
Appeals had directed) . B.A.M. had argued the "appeal" of the
administrative decision (to enforce the exactions) was not
a pre-requisite to litigation; on that point the Supreme
Court sided with the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court ultimately
directed that the case be remanded for trial, again before
Judge Timothy Hanson.
The
appeals

factually-inaccurate
from

the

40-foot

statements

line)

(ala Plaintiff

contained

within

the

appellate court's explanation of the historic background of
the case are dicta,- those statements were not contained
within the appellate court's opinion as to its legal
reasoning, nor were those statements material or relevant to
the court's holding or to the issues pertinent on remand.
Given the tortured history of this case, the COUNTY should
not be granted an undeserved (and inaccurate) "windfall"
from the factual and technical inaccuracies the COUNTY
itself procured

either at trial or upon appeal

in cases

ultimately resolved adversely to the COUNTY'S position.
From

"day One" of

this situation

the COUNTY, as

required by its "highway-abutting" Ordinance, has required
the full "53 foot" dedication and improvements. From the
9

filing

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint

(for

"inverse

condemnation"), the entirety of those "excessive" exactions
has always been at issue. The COUNTY ought now be heard to
complain about the size of Plaintiff's claims.
The "constitutional" (i.e. inverse condemnation claims)
considerations of this case eclipse and override what might
be applicable in other "administrative appeal" situations.
See Colman and Hansen decisions, cited in APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 3
THE COUNTY'S "COSTS TO THE COMMUNITY" ARGUMENT
The COUNTY begins its discussion [page 19 of its BRIEF
OF APPELLEE] by citing the very same Paragraph 13 of BAM III
quoted above. The COUNTY then quotes the now-infamous
"Footnote #5", which the COUNTY found so objectionable when
this Court's decision in BAM III was first issued in July
2008 and for which the COUNTY "petitioned for rehearing" to
delete

that

Footnote

#5.FOOTNOTE1

While

implicitly

acknowledging that the remainder of the Court's decision in
BAM III was unchanged and while simultaneously ignoring the
otherwise precise and absolutely clear text of the unchanged
provisions of Paragraphs 12 and 13 of BAM III, the COUNTY

x

At the time
summer of 2008
the COUNTY argued for
deletion of the Footnote because, the COUNTY claimed, the
offending Footnote made it difficult for the COUNTY to talk
to and coordinate with other governmental agencies. The
disingenuousness of that formerly-asserted position is now
obvious to all.
10

manufactures the "cost to the community" argument upon which
its entire defense has been based.
Of course the Plaintiff B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT argues

vigorously the "costs to the County" (and more specifically,
the COUNTY'S lack of costs) issue: this Court in BAM III
clearly mandated such to be the focus of the trial on
remand. The Supreme Court was absolutely clear in its
mandate to the District Court; that the District Court
failed to follow the mandate should not be grounds for the
Supreme Court to do the same. The Supreme Court should
follow its own "costs to the County" directive.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 4
"DOUBLE TAXATION" IN CONTRAVENTION TO BANBERRY
The COUNTY argues that this Court's decision in the
case of Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981), and the socalled "double taxation" argument arising thereunder, is
inapplicable to the case-at-hand. The COUNTY asserts that
Banberry involved only development "fees", for which the
relevant issues were codified (and thus superseded) in the
Utah Impact Fees Act, 11-36-101 et seq, Utah Code. Plaintiff
vigorously

disagree's

with

the

COUNTY'S

self-serving,

incorrect conclusion (Banberry is inapplicable).FOOTNOTE2
2

The COUNTY'S "Banberry argument" (i.e. that Banberry's
7-element test for compliance with the "constitutional
standard of reasonableness" is inapplicable to the in-kind
11

Ultimately, it will be for this Court to determine the
applicability

generalized or specific

to the case-at-

hand. The underlying reasons for the COUNTY'S position is
two-fold:
1.

The COUNTY, not having complied with Banberry

in the first instance, would like to continue in
that

ostrich-head-in-the-sand

know-nothing

position.
2.

The COUNTY, quite literally "on-the-ropes" for

the "double-taxation" issues undeniably brought to
bear in the B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT exactions, would
like

to

avoid

the

application

of

the

"constitutional standard of reasonableness" to the
situation-at-hand.
The Plaintiff B.A.M. believes and asserts Banberry (and
its

7-element

criteria

for

compliance

with

the

"constitutional standard of reasonableness") is undeniably
applicable to this situation, for at least the following
reasons:
exactions imposed against Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT) is
strikingly similar to the COUNTY'S long-argued position that
"Dolan is inapplicable" to the "takings" effected against
Plaintiff B.A.M. Recall that the COUNTY persisted in making
the "Dolan is inapplicable" argument even after all three
judges of the Utah Court of Appeals had ruled otherwise (in
BAM I) . It was only after the Legislature had adopted
legislation incorporating Dolan's "rough proportionality"
standard and the Utah Supreme Court had ruled in BAM II
(that Dolan was applicable) that the COUNTY abandoned that
frivolous argument.
12

1.

Banberry was decided and written by the Utah

Supreme

Court not merely

for the purpose of

deciding the case (i.e. the "South Jordan City"
litigation) then before the Court on appeal, but
rather for illuminating the broader standard which
would be applicable in similarly-situated cases.
2.

Banberry was concerned not only with "fees",

but

also

with

"exactions".

Indeed,

the

Utah

Supreme Court used the both terms, even in the
same sentence.
3.

It makes no sense whatsoever, in articulating

and developing the "constitutional standard of
reasonableness", for the Supreme Court to apply
the standard to "fees" but not apply the standard
to in-kind exactions

(such as dedications and

improvements).
4.

Banberry

guidance

in

was

understood

later-developing

and

written

cases

for

(almost

prophetically) involving these "constitutional"
issues. The 7-element test for compliance with the
"constitutional standard of reasonableness" makes
no sense whatsoever if "fees" are covered, but inkind exactions (e.g. dedications and improvements)
are not.
Within this narrow setting
13

ala the intended breadth

and depth of Banberry

it must be noted that Banberry

"speaks for itself". Similarly, this Court is the ultimate
arbiter

of

what

Banberry

means

and

has,

since 1981,

required. Likewise, the nature of this case

(and more

specifically, this "reply" brief) ought not be a "law review
article" dissecting every word of Banberry.
Concededly, the predicate fact situation leading up to
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Banberry involved only
"development fees". But that feature should not be read to
restrict

the Court's more expansive discussion of the

relevant constitutional issues. In the opening paragraphs of
Banberry, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the procedural
history of that specific appeal. The Court noted that both
parties appealed. The Court then reviewed the then-existing
Utah case law on the validity of water connection and park
improvement fees. Immediately following the discussion of
the four Utah appellate decisions, all of which were within
the immediately-preceding decade and the last three of which
were within but two years, the Utah Supreme Court wrote:
These four decisions have resolved the
legality of water connection and park improvement
fees designed to raise funds to enlarge and
improve sewer and water systems and recreational
opportunities, as well as the legality of
conditioning water hookups or plat approval on
their collection. However, these decisions leave
open the question of the reasonableness of any
individual
fee charged or land dedication
required. This question of reasonableness must be
resolved on the facts in each particular case. We
therefore reverse both judgments and remand the
14

entire case for trial on the reasonableness of the
fees the city has impose in this case.
Because this case is being remanded for trial,
it is appropriate for this Court to elaborate on
the constitutional standards of reasonableness
that should govern the validity of subdivision
charges such as these.
631 P.2d at 901-902. Emphasis added.
It is obvious from the quoted text that the Utah
Supreme Court was

as in many appellate decisions

writing

not merely for direction to the trial court in that case for
re-trial following remand, but was writing for a broader
audience and application. The Banberry Court recognized the
"open" status of the "question of reasonableness", as per
the four previously-decided opinions. Indeed, the Court
expanded its description of "reasonableness" to include not
only an "individual fee charged" but also a "land dedication
required". Recognizing the broader purpose of its appellate
decision, the Court noted the more expansive purpose of its
opinion to future cases: the Court stated that "[t]his
question of reasonableness must be resolved on the facts in
each particular case," Emphasis added. Indeed, the Court was
thinking about more than the "South Jordan City case";
otherwise, the phrase "each particular case" would have no
meaning, relevance, application or necessity. The Court
concluded its introductory comments by elaborating upon
"the constitutional standards of reasonableness
that should govern the validity of subdivision
charges such as these."
15

Id. at 902. Emphasis added. The Court utilized the phrase
"subdivision charges" (not merely "fees), thus connoting a
more broad scope to its announced principles: to include
"land dedications" previously referred to. The Court also
used the nomenclature "subdivision charges such as these"
(emphasis added) , thus implying that the announced principle
had

broader

application:

perhaps

to

other

kinds

of

situations more than just "fees" or "dedications", but
perhaps "in-kind improvements" of the type required against
B.A.M.
The

Banberry

decision

approached

the

two

fees

separately.
In addressing the water connection fee, the Banberry
court referred to the New Jersey case, in which the Utah
Supreme Court noted that "the rules governing the allocation
of improvement costs between city and developer
would ideally have been such as to insure, to the
greatest extent practicable, that the cost of
extending a municipal water facility would fall
equitably upon those who are similarly situated
and in a just proportion to benefits conferred, •
631 P. 2d at 903. Emphasis added. Note that the Utah Supreme
Court utilized the phrase "allocation of improvement costs"
in a broad fashion; wording such as "fees paid" was not
used. In additionally explaining the "fall equitably [and]
benefits

conferred"

relationship,

continued:
16

the Banberry

opinion

Stated otherwise, to comply with the standard of
reasonableness, a municipal fee must not require
newly developed properties to bear more than their
equitable share of the capital costs in relation
to the benefits conferred.
Id. at 903. Emphasis added. The constitutional principle is
couched in terms of "bear more then their equitable share of
the capital costs": a more broad principle than merely
"paying fees". "Capital costs" as a concept connotes the inkind improvements which the COUNTY has here required and
which B.A.M. installed.
Immediately

thereafter

in the lead-in to the 7-

element "factors" to be considered

the Banberry opinion

continues:
To determine the equitable share of the
capital costs to be borne by newly developed
properties, a municipality should determine the
relative burdens previously borne and yet to be
borne by those properties in comparison with other
properties as a whole; the fee in question should
not exceed the appoint sufficient to equalize the
relative burdens of newly developed and other
properties.
Among the most
important
factors the
municipality should consider in determining the
relative burden already borne and yet to be borne
by newly developed properties and other properties
are the following, suggested by the well-reasoned
authorities cited below:
[citation of the 7 "factors", and cases]
631 P.2d at 903-904. Emphasis added.
Applied to the instant situation, "the equitable share
of the capital costs to be borne by [B.A.M.]" ought to be
ZERO: the same

"capital costs" which are not paid by
17

similarly-situated (in terms of "traffic" impact), but which
are not "highway-abutting". It is hardly "equitable" to
force B.A.M., being "highway-abutting", to incur 100% of the
expenses for the roadway dedication and improvements along
the 900-foot frontage of his development, when similarlysituated developments pay nothing.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 5
COUNTY'S CLAIM OF "BALANCING OF COSTS"
The flaw in the COUNTY'S arguments

together with its

presentation of the "evidence" to the trial court, even
accepted by the trial court

is that those arguments

disregard the specific direction of the Supreme Court in BAM
III, as noted above: the COUNTY has no costs.
The COUNTY'S analysis of the evidence is additionally
flawed in that the evidence and analysis both ignore the
unconstitutional, discriminatory effect imposed upon B . A. M. :
that only "highway-abutting" developers are required to
incur the costs of the State Road 171 improvements.
This Court should simply answer the fundamental
rhetorical

even

question which the COUNTY'S "expert witness"

(Mr Nepstad) simply couldn't

(or wouldn't)

effectively

answer:
How are the other developments, not "highwayabutting", expected to pay for the impact they
create upon the State Road 171 roadway? How is it
that only B.A.M. and other "highway abutting"
developers have to pay?
For all of his "expert witness" status and stature
18

essentially based upon the "hearsay" evidence the COUNTY
told him to know

Mr Nepstad could not respond to that

inquiry.
The

"costs

to the government"

(or

"costs to the

community") argument is novel, but it is not what the
Supreme

Court

directed

the

trial

court

to

consider.

Presumably, the Supreme Court was well aware of the fact
as required (now) by the Utah Constitution and as always
directed by statute

that state "fuels taxes" and similar

taxation resources are to be devoted exclusively to state
roadways. [Indeed, such was probably the theoretical basis
for the now famous "Footnote #5" (from the July 2008 initial
version of BAM III) , deleted by the Court in October 2008.]
However, the procedural deletion of the "Footnote #5" does
not

and should not

now that the "evidence is in" on that

specific issue, change the Court's fundamental understanding
or application of the legal principles. If those "fuels
taxes" and other "taxation" revenues are paying for the
UDOT-directed roadway improvements anyway, the "costs to the
government" argument is very misleading and for that reason
inappropriate.
The COUNTY'S "cost to the government" approach, coupled
with the "balancing of interests" analysis, is flawed in two
major particulars:
1.

The analysis (and the COUNTY'S trial court
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evidence)

ignores

the

simple

fact

that

State

"fuels taxes" and other across-the-board revenues
pay for State roadway

improvements, including

State Road 171.
2.

That

B.A.M.,

as

a

"highway-abutting"

developer, has been unconstitutionally singled-out
for

disparate,

discriminatory

treatment

(i.e.

B.A.M. had to dedicate and improve: $391,000+)
when other similarly-situated (i.e. same "traffic"
impact) developers paid nothing, thus offending
"equal protection of laws" and "uniform operation
of laws" principles. All of the accounting and
engineering and smoke-and-mirrors argument cannot
overcome this simple fact: under the COUNTY'S
scheme, only "highway-abutting" developers have to
pay, while everyone else gets "a pass".
The

COUNTY'S

"benefit

conferred"

statements

and

arguments are incorrect and flawed; as such, the COUNTY'S
arguments evidence a complete lack of understanding of the
"benefit conferred" principle applicable to this situation.
The "benefit conferred" analysis does not focus "upon the
COUNTY" (as the COUNTY argues, for which it received no
"benefit" to the improvement of State Road 171 because it
was not the owner thereof).
The

"benefit"

analysis
20

falls

apart

due

to

the

discriminatory effect which has been imposed upon B.A.M.:
only "highway-abutting" developers are required to make the
"dedications" and the "improvements" thereto. Similarlysituated developments, creating the same "impact" but which
are not "highway-abutting" are immune from any "exaction":
the COUNTY has no "road impact fee".FOOTNOTE3
The COUNTY'S seeming argument that the District Court
(Judge Toomey) correctly divined the Supreme Court intent on
the "ambiguity" (COUNTY'S terminology) within BAM III is a
"stretch", at best: Judge Toomey disregarded the clear,
unambiguous "mandate" directive of BAM III.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL OF POINT 6
TRIAL COURT'S ABUSIVE REFUSAL TO HEAR PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
The COUNTY asserts this issue not preserved in the
record or properly presented in Appellant's brief. That
assertion is incorrect.
The in-court dialogue between Plaintiff's counsel and
the District Court (Judge Toomey) was more than adequately
3

Although an infinite number of hypothetical examples
could be devised to illustrate the facially-obvious
discriminatory effect, one example would suffice. For
example, if B.A.M.'s parcel were, in north-south dimension,
only four hundred feet (instead of the seven hundred feet it
is) , the overall "net,f area for "lots" (and houses and
persons) would be one-half of the former. Correspondingly,
the "impact" (as defined by "traffic on the roads) would be
one-half, but the "highway-abutting Ordinance" would still
require dedication and improvement of the full 53-foot
width.
Other hypothetical examples could be derived to achieve
a "confiscatory" result.
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identified and described within APPELLANT'S BRIEF. Judge
Toomey had ample opportunity to rule to allow Mr Smith's
"expert witness" testimony, but she refused
discretion" reasons

for "abuse of

to hear that testimony.

The Plaintiff's arguments concerning the trial court's
abuse of discretion in denying Mr Smith's testimony was
additionally preserved within the Plaintiff's "Memorandum"
in support of the "motion for new trial". These specific
arguments to the trial court were presented generally at
RECORD, at pp. 933-936.
CONCLUSION
The COUNTY advocated, and the District Court accepted,
the incorrect jurisprudential standard to be applied in
honoring the Supreme Court's mandate in BJ^M III. The "duty
to marshal the evidence" in light of that incorrectlyfollowed standard is meaningless: doing so with only further
distract us from the appropriate considerations of the case,
as per the express directives of BAM III.
The evidence is clear: B.A.M. incurred $391,000+ in
costs and expenses for the improvement of State Road 171,
which

under the jurisdiction of UDOT

financial

responsibility.

Other

the COUNTY has no
similarly-situated

developments (but not "highway-abutting") are required to
pay nothing for their "impact".
The

7-element

test

for
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Respectfully submitted this 5th da; of July, 2011.
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